


**S&T Campaign: Human Sciences**  
*Integration of Humans and Systems*  
*Humans in Multi-Agent Systems*

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## Research Objective

- Define and standardize critical measures of military cyber-security team performance
- Evaluate the technical instruments available for recording these measures
- Define gaps in metric collection and evaluation; explore methods to address them



Performance and Assessment Elements of Cyber Defense Exercise

## Challenges


- Tool- and process-based gaps exist in data collection and scoring efforts.
- The complexity and adversarial nature of real-world cyber security does not easily lend itself to controlled laboratory studies.
- Collection and analysis of individual and team performance in cyber defense exercises is essential and valuable, but requires significant overhead in addition to exercise organization.

## ARL Facilities and Capabilities Available to Support Collaborative Research

- Cognitive Assessment, Simulation, and Engineering Laboratory (CASEL) at APG, MD
- CHIMERA (Cyber-Human Integrated Modeling and Experimentation Range-Army) Laboratory facilities enable network simulation and testing for tool prototypes
- Intelligence analysts are available for insights into cyber protection team processes and tasks.
- Ongoing collaborations through the ARL Cyber Security Collaborative Research Agreement (CRA)
  - Continued interaction and integration with the National Guard at annual Cyber Shield training event


## Results

- Cyber Protection Team (CPT) performance was highly variable (novice to expert teams) given by the number and probability of detecting ongoing cyber attacks.



Team Exercise Completion and Average Detection Times

- The teams exhibiting the fastest detection times were also the ones that detected the fewest events; thus, detection times need to be understood in terms of relative difficulty and context of the cyber attacks.



- Some events were challenging to detect. The outlier Event #16 is an ongoing Industrial Control System (ICS)/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) attack. This highlights a critical cybersecurity challenge to a known vulnerability.

## Complementary Expertise/ Facilities/ Capabilities Sought in Collaboration

- Tools to support automated collection – reduce resource / personnel needs
- Standards for data collection and automation processes across multiple training environments and/or events
- Expertise and knowledge of ICS and SCADA environments to integrate with cyber security knowledge and practice
- Greater access to CPT teams and cyber security exercises / events would provide more avenues to test and validate tools and metric collection